

Breaking the Conflict Cycle: Incorporating Stability Operations Into a Cycle Framework

**A Monograph
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Abstract

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Failed, failing, and collapsed states and regions all provide opportunities for conflict and intervention in order to promote the security of the United States. Recognizing the opportunity to implement a change in how the United States plans and executes reconstruction and stabilization assistance for foreign states and regions, the President of the United States issued National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-44. The result was DoD Directive 3000.5, Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations, stating stability operations are a core U.S. military mission.

The release of the new FM 3-07, *Stability Operations*, in October 2008 was the Army's attempt to incorporate Stability Operations into the Full Spectrum Operations concept discussed in FM 3-0, *Operations*. While groundbreaking in its potential for change in the areas of conflict prevention, varied solutions to complex problems, and its depiction of stability operations within Full Spectrum Operations, the Army has limited ability to incorporate that potential.

In order to understand why the US Army has a limited ability to incorporate the potential of FM 3-07, this monograph dissects the Army's current use of the Spectrum of Conflict – a linear mode of thinking ill suited to the conflicts of the 21st century. Understanding why the Spectrum of Conflict is no longer applicable to future conflicts leads into a discussion of how the Organization of Cooperation and Security in Europe's conflict cycle model is better suited for 21st century conflict and the full incorporation of stability operations within Full Spectrum Operations.

This monograph advocates the Army's adoption of the conflict cycle with the stages of early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management, and post-conflict reconstruction in order to allow FM 3-07 to meet its full potential and to break the conflict of cycle enduring in many parts of the world today.

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Introduction

The role of the United States in the world is changing and with it the role of the United States military. Failed, failing, and collapsed states and regions all provide opportunities for conflict and intervention in order to promote the security of the United States. As an adaptive organization, the U.S. Government recognizes the need for revisions in U.S. policy and in how it currently does and will manage any conflict that threatens the interests of the nation. The increasing interconnectedness of the world demands a revision in how the government uses the elements of national power to manage conflict. In particular, how the military is used. While many within the military appreciate the fact that conflict is complex, few are able to grasp how the increasing interconnectedness of the world has changed conflict and the military's role.¹ Conflict is no longer strictly a military endeavor or even one only the military is capable of solving. The Army of the 20th century solved problems; the Army of the 21st century must be able to manage problems within the operational environment in which it operates. Senior leaders operating in this environment must effectively combine the military element with the other elements of national power if they want to manage and not try to solve the conflicts of the future.

This changing role for the United States started with a revision in policy at the Presidential level. The policy revision focused on how the United States needs to manage conflict in the present and future in order to promote the security of the United States. Part of it involved understanding that effectively planning and executing reconstruction and stabilization assistance for foreign states and regions is one way to promote the security of the United States. In National

¹ Henry H. Gaffney Jr., "Globalization and U.S. Navy Forces." Center for Strategic Studies - CRM D0005743.A1/Final (2002). Retrieved 13 March 2009 from http://www.nwc.navy.mil/cnws/marstrat/docs/library/Gaffney_USN_Global.pdf, 111; Anthony H. Cordesman, "Globalization and US Military Planning", Retrieved 13 March 2009 from <http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/000301globalization.pdf>, 2.

Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) – 44, President George W. Bush set forth a policy that works to anticipate state failure and to respond quickly and effectively to promote peace, security, development, democratic practices, market economies, and the rule of law when necessary or appropriate.² The need for a coordinated, “whole of government”, approach in conducting reconstruction and stabilization assistance manifests itself by indentifying states at risk, coordinating preventative strategies, responding to crises that occur, and finally executing reconstruction and stabilization in harmony with the U.S. military. As a result of NSPD-44, the Department of Defense issued Directive 3000.5, Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations, stating stability operations are a core U.S. military mission.³ In turn, NSPD-44 and DOD 3000.5 both helped shape the revision first of Joint Publication 3-07.3, *Peace Operations*, and eventually the Army’s revision of FM 3-07, *Stability Operations*.

As this paper will show, the revised FM 3-07 is a groundbreaking step in the U.S. Army’s understanding of how to manage conflict and a direct reflection of the President’s Directive in combining the military with the other elements of national power in reconstruction and stabilization. The concepts within the manual are sound and have a tremendous amount to offer both the military and policy makers in the government in its broadening of the definition of stability operations. This broadening of the definition of stability operations, designed to make

² National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD-44, *Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization*, (Washington, DC: The White House, December 7, 2005).

³ Under DOD 3000.5, stability operations were identified as a core mission of the U.S. military, commensurate with the conduct of combat operations. The directive noted that proper planning and execution of the stabilization or postcombat phase of operations was essential to achieving lasting victory and the rapid withdrawal of U.S. forces. The directive urged creation of training programs that would equip military personnel to perform essential functions until they could be transferred to civilian authorities. Robert M. Perito ed., *Guide for Participants in Peace, Stability, and Relief Operations*, (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007), 234.

stability operations more part of full spectrum operations, is critical to the success of the Army in achieving national security for the United States in the 21st century. There is, however, a significant obstacle in fully implementing the concepts within FM 3-07. The Army's continued linearity of thinking, as expressed by its view of conflict as a spectrum, limits both the effectiveness of stability operations and the Army. In order to remain relevant and effective as a policy tool in 21st century environment, the U.S. Army must replace its linear thinking with cyclical thinking, changing the spectrum of conflict to a conflict cycle.

Despite the publication of a vastly superior doctrine in the revised FM 3-07 when compared with the old, the Army will still face numerous obstacles and challenges when it tries to incorporate stability operations. Full Spectrum Operations, and more specifically Stability Operations, fail to meet their full potential when viewing conflict along a spectrum. In its linear approach to conflict, the spectrum is not able to take full advantage of the concept of conflict prevent, it limits solutions to problems by viewing conflict on an ascending scale, and forces conflicts into definitive beginnings and ends. All of which run counter to the principles espoused within the new Stability Operations manual. If the Army truly desires to remain relevant and prepared as the defender of the United States within the New World Order, then it must visualize conflict differently.

The Army has not fully incorporated Stability Operations into Full Spectrum Operations, despite the fact that it claims they are. Fully incorporating them will require the Army to envision conflict as a cycle. The four stages of the conflict cycle – early warning, conflict prevention, conflict management, and post-conflict reconstruction retain all the basic principles of FM 3-0. The concepts of Full Spectrum Operations and Phases of a Campaign align well with the cycle and still allow for the understanding needed to manage, rather than solve, future conflict. Depicting conflict as a cycle versus a spectrum is essential to allowing three key ideas from FM 3-07 to live up to their full potential in managing conflict: conflict prevention, finding varied

solutions to complex problems, and the idea that stability operations are not separate but rather fully incorporated into Full Spectrum Operations.

Incorporating stability operations at the operational level becomes less challenging and more realistic when picturing conflict as a cycle. Using the conflict cycle, stability operations allow for a scope and degree of military force versus a scale, allow for true unity of effort in the United States Government responses to crises, and better facilitate a complex systems approach to viewing the challenges facing the United States Army. In order to conceptualize how this would work the paper shows how Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) and the concept of Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACGs) are real world examples of how to intervene within the conflict cycle. The result is an Army that enhances US foreign policy and the national security of the nation.

Dissecting the Spectrum of Conflict


In FM 3-0, *Operations*, the United States Army uses the spectrum of conflict to frame Army operations. The spectrum places levels of violence on an ascending scale marked by graduated steps⁴. This spans from stable peace to general war. The manual recognizes that some conflicts do not proceed according to the steps in the spectrum and that “the levels of violence may jump from one point on the spectrum to another”⁵. The Army designed the spectrum to help it understand and visualize the level of violence of conflicts and its role in resolving conflict within the spectrum. The goal of Commanders and staffs operating within the spectrum is to both



⁴ Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-0, *Operations*, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2008), 2-1.

⁵ Ibid.

advance U.S. national strategic goals.⁶ The theory behind the spectrum is that Army forces can operate anywhere on the spectrum. The desired endstate is always a return to stable peace. In addition, the Army has attached Operational Themes to the Spectrum of Conflict. These Operational Themes often help to characterize the scale of the force involved and the major



operation’s general characteristics of the campaign the Army is conducting.

In the introduction to FM 3-0, the Army recognizes it now operates in a “complex period of prolonged conflicts and opportunities” and that “21st century conflict involves more than combat between armed opponents, shaping the broader situation through nonlethal actions to restore security and normalcy to the local populace”.⁷ Additionally, FM 3-07 speaks of the Army entering an “era of persistent conflict”, one where the military must operate across a broad range of operations. These operations vary from high intensity conflict to defeating insurgencies to assisting fragile states to providing humanitarian aid. The fact is conflict is multifaceted and rarely means sending the Army in only once a situation has deteriorated to armed conflict or as the level of violence in a conflict increases. The Army of the 21st century has to view conflict with an approach that addresses the prevention of conflict as much as the resolution of conflict.

⁶ Ibid.

As with others in the international community, the U.S. Government has in the past viewed conflict and its resolution as finding the right way to enter a conflict, rather than taking a wider view of conflict prevention and the timing of their intervention.⁸

Because the Army operates in an era of persistent conflict, conflict is multifaceted, and conflict prevention is necessary, this author's assessment is that the current framing of Army operations along a spectrum does not work to accomplish the United States National Security Strategy. There are three problems with framing Army operations as a spectrum. First, the spectrum does not address how the U.S. Army can prevent or avoid conflict, it simply presents it as a given. Second, the spectrum constricts our view of violence and thereby limits the solutions we find for it. Third, it shows "stable peace" as the beginning when the term may be a misnomer in the places the Army is most likely to need to intervene.

Failure to Address Conflict Prevention

While the Army touts conflict prevention in its Operations and Stability Operations manuals, it lacks a comprehensive understanding of how the term links into the broader operations of the Army in defense of U.S. national interests. This lack of comprehension is a direct result of viewing conflict in a linear fashion. Because FM 3-0 places conflict prevention under the operational theme of peace operations, somewhere between stable peace and insurgency on the Spectrum of Conflict, it already assumes an increasing level of violence. This linearity in thinking continues with FM 3-0 defining peace operations as "crisis response and limited contingency operations" happening once parties have already initiated conflict, rather than

⁷ Ibid., vii.

⁸ Hugh Miall, Oliver Ramsbotham, and Tom Woodhouse, "Calling for a Broad Approach to Conflict Resolution" in *Searching for Peace in Europe and Eurasia: An Overview of Conflict Prevention*

actions taken prior to hostilities or before any increase in violence.⁹ In its linear line of thinking, the Army is failing to view conflict prevention as a way to decrease violence or prevent its occurrence in the first place. A more comprehensive understanding of conflict prevention needs to incorporate the definitions used by international scholars, so that the U.S. can use the Army to prevent and manage conflict and not solve it. Michael Lund states conflict prevention is “actions taken in vulnerable places and times to avoid the threat or use of armed force and related forms of coercion by states or groups to settle the political disputes that can arise from the destabilizing effects of economic, social, political, and international change”.¹⁰ While Roderick K. von Lipsey defines it as, “the employment of those measures and mechanisms that reduce tensions, deter lawlessness, or coerce cooperation between individuals, groups, and the state in such a way as to prevent the occurrence of violence.”¹¹ These definitions clearly indicate “conflict prevention” takes place before the start of a conflict and not once hostilities are already in progress. Breaking the cycle of “persistent conflict” means understanding conflict prevention occurs before violence erupts.

Portrayal of Violence

The second problem with viewing conflict as a linear spectrum is its portrayal of violence as an ascending scale and military involvement along that scale. Viewing violence as an ascending scale tends to indicate that, as the level of violence increases so should the amount of force and the role of the military. This can and does limit the number and type of solutions the

and Peacebuilding Activities, ed. van Tongeren, Paul, Hans van de Veen, and Juliette Verhoeven (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), 72.

⁹ FM 3-0, 2-8.

¹⁰ Michael Lund, *Preventing Violent Conflicts: A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy*, (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996), 37.

¹¹ Roderick K. von Lipsey, “The Intervention Cycle” in *Breaking the Cycle*, ed. Roderick K. von Lipsey (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), 5.

Army applies to conflicts, including whether it classifies something as conflict in the first place. Managing conflict in the 21st century¹² necessitates the U.S. Army planning for and executing robust military interventions in the stable peace, unstable peace, and insurgency stages of the spectrum.¹³ They do not lend themselves to limited contributions and support from the military during these stages.¹⁴ Nor traditionally have historical military operations fit nicely into the Spectrum of Conflict – Somalia, Iraq, and Afghanistan are all examples of operations that required more forces as the violence decreased rather than increased.

While the Spectrum of Conflict shows Stable Peace on the lower end of the violence scale and within current Army logic requiring fewer Army forces, this vastly underestimates how the Army will need to manage conflict in the 21st century. Terrorism, “War Amongst the People”, ethnic cleansing, rogue nonstate actors – preventing all of these threats and many more from threatening the security of the United States will require the Army to provide more support to operations conducted in Stable Peace than in further stages along the spectrum. In continuing to view conflict along a linear spectrum, the Army is dedicating its limited personnel to the wrong threats. For instance, a linear spectrum of conflict focuses the Army’s intelligence resources on nation-states, with an emphasis towards engaging in major combat operations, instead of on what

¹² In “New Paradigms for 21st Century Conflict: The Need for a Grand Strategy for Combating Terrorism”, David J. Kilcullen describes 21st century conflict as “war amongst the people, where the utility of military forces depends on their ability to adapt to complex political contexts and engage nonstate opponents under the critical gaze of global public opinion” where “success will depend on our ability to adapt, evolve new responses, and get ahead of a rapidly changing threat environment”. Retrieved 18 May 2009 from <http://www.america.gov/st/peacesec-english/2008/May/20080522172835SrenoD0.8730585.html>

¹³ William W. Mendel, “US Forces: Many Roles in the 21st Century” Retrieved 13 March 2009 from <http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/newroles/newroles.htm#1a>; Carafano, James Jay. “America’s Military for 21st Century Mission”. Heritage Lecture #810. Retrieved 13 March 2009 from <http://www.heritage.org/research/nationalsecurity/hl810.cfm>.

¹⁴ Ibid.

is happening in the world and particularly with non-state actors.¹⁵ Though FM 3-0 states, “21st century conflict involves more than combat between armed opponents”¹⁶, the spectrum limits how the military views its role by predicating its involvement on the amount of violence present in any given conflict. The doctrine within FM 3-0 makes this clear by showing limited intervention in both unstable peace and insurgency stages of the spectrum. The days when the Commander in Chief only sends in the Army to intervene when violence reaches its highest levels are gone.¹⁷ The Army cannot afford to think of its various operational environments only as increasing in their severity of violence. If it continues to do so, it misses the opportunity to stop violence before it begins in the cases where intervention would make a difference and fails to see how a New World Order for the United States has also created a new reality for the U.S. Army. While operational environments help the Army train for conflict, it necessarily limits its ability to fully integrate and continuously execute stability tasks.

Definitive Beginnings and Ends

The third problem with viewing conflict as a spectrum is its depiction of major combat operations within the framework of conflicts on the spectrum as having definitive beginnings and ends. This means a definitive start and end to military involvement in managing conflict, which the military defines too narrowly today to manage the conflicts of the future. Within the spectrum, the Army focuses most of its planning and training on beginning and ending major combat operations. This focus restricts the Army’s ability to incorporate unequivocally the principles of stability operations; principles that constitute action prior to and after any potential

¹⁵ Kilcullen.

¹⁶ FM 3-0, viii.

¹⁷ Frank G. Hoffman, “Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars” Potomac Institute for Policy Studies (December 2007). Retrieved 13 March 2009 from http://www.potomacinstitute.org/publications/Potomac_HybridWar_0108.pdf, 9.

armed conflict. In order to achieve conditions that result in stable and lasting peace to prevent or even lessen future major combat operations, stability operations necessitate a close coordination and synchronization between military and nonmilitary organizations from the start of U.S. involvement. The military limits this synchronization and coordination by viewing conflict as something to solve; something it alone can do. If the military does not learn to manage conflict in terms other than through major combat operations then its success at integrating stability operations will be minor. The spectrum of conflict simply does not allow for the full integration of stability operations when competing with offensive and defensive operations along a scale of increasing violence.

In FM 3-07, Chapter 2 “Stability in Full Spectrum Operations”, the manual reinforces the concept that the essence of full spectrum operations is the ability of the Army to combine offensive, defensive, and stability operations.¹⁸ Only combining the three will give the Army the opportunity to achieve the decisive results it desires. While FM 3-0 states that the active involvement of the U.S. Army may shift along the spectrum¹⁹, the problem is the spectrum’s ultimate focus on major combat operations. In an “Era of Persistent Conflict”, this focus is misplaced and detrimental to the equality of stability operations, in terms of Army resources and training, with offensive and defensive operations. Operations today can move from a permissive to semi-permissive to non-permissive environment and then back again with lightning speed; the Army must be able to change its operations to fit its environment.

Under the Spectrum of Conflict, the Army has organized itself and remains mainly concerned with solving conflicts, in terms of major combat operations, and to a more limited

¹⁸ Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-07, *Stability Operations*. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2008), 2-1.

¹⁹ FM 3-0, 2-3.

extent post-conflict reconstruction. The release of the new FM 3-07 attempts to draw focus to and bring stability operations on par with offense and defense, per DOD directive. The Army's use of the Spectrum of Conflict as a framework for full spectrum operations contains inherent flaws for managing the national security concerns of the 21st century as listed in the National Security Strategy.²⁰ It also fails to reflect the reality that many combatant commanders deal with. General William E. (Kip) Ward, the Commander of U.S. Africa Command, acknowledges that the Army must incorporate stability operations more broadly into their operations to achieve long-term effects.²¹ He contends, "conflict prevention is a key objective" and necessary "for fostering economic and societal development that helps address some of the root causes of instability worldwide".²² General Ward's article ends by noting that a return to the stable stage on the spectrum of conflict does not equate to a reduction in the Army's level of engagement. A further vindication that the Army should not tie its military involvement to an ascending scale of violence and put definitive beginning and ends on its major efforts. Guides published for military audiences by the United States Institute of Peace further this view by stating, "U.S. forces conduct stability operations to deter war, resolve conflict, promote peace, strengthen democratic processes, retain U.S. influence or access abroad, and support moral and legal imperatives".²³ The Army must organize itself and concern itself with conflict prevention, force allocation as they relate to pre and post conflict activities, and the recurring cycle of violence, that occurs within many parts of the world today. "Although military personnel are trained and organized primarily to conduct combat operations, that same training and organization give them a unique capability

²⁰ The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, The White House, March 2006.

²¹ General William E. Kipp, "Operationalizing FM 3-07, *Stability Operations*, in U.S. Africa Command" in *ARMY* magazine, February 2009, 29-30.

²² Ibid., 30.

²³ Perito, 234.

to undertake many of the functions involved in stability operations”.²⁴ One way for the Army to organize effectively and to change its approach to conflict is to view conflict as a cycle.

The Conflict Cycle

Viewing conflict as a cycle is widely accepted in the field of international relations and is instrumental for understanding how conflict prevention, conflict management, and post-conflict reconstruction reside within the overall framework of conflict.²⁵ While the exact number of phases and their labeling differ, depicting conflict in cyclic form has two distinct advantages. First, many scholars in the international relations and peace research fields divide conflict into phases and cycles in order to further understand conflict. Their research centers on where in the cycle conflict prevention, management, and resolution reside and at what point those within the international community must intervene.²⁶ Additionally, many scholars choose to view conflict as a cycle in order to demonstrate how conflict progresses in recurring patterns.²⁷ In order to end this recurring cycle of conflict, someone or something has to intervene within the cycle. In a New World Order, where the President can direct the U.S. Army to provide humanitarian relief or fight wars against non-state actors, the Army needs to view conflict as a cycle. The conflicts of the 21st

²⁴ Ibid., 279.

²⁵ Erik Melander and Claire Pigache. “Conflict Prevention: Concepts and Challenges” Retrieved 25 February 2009 from www.bmlv.gv.at/pdf_pool/publikationen/konfliktpraev_02_concept-challenges_e_melander_c_pigache_10.pdf, 11-12; Niklas Swanström, Mikael Weissmann and Emma Björnehed, *Conflict Prevention and Conflict Management in Northeast Asia*. Retrieved 25 February 2009 from www.silkroadstudies.org/new/docs/beijing/CPinNEA_full.pdf, 23-25; Niklas L.P. Swanstrom and Mikael S. Weissmann. *Conflict, Conflict Prevention, Conflict Management and Beyond: a conceptual exploration*. Retrieved 25 February 2009 from files/publications/nswanstrom/05/ns05conflictconflict.pdf, 9-10; Antoine Gouzee de Harven, “The Challenge of Integration in Conflict Management and its Implications for the African Peace Facility’s Exit Strategies” Academic Paper, retrieved 24 February 2009 from <http://antoinegouzee.com/>, 40-41.

²⁶ Melander and Pigache, 11-12; Swanstrom, Weissmann, and Bjornehed, 23-25; Gouzee de Harven, 40-41.

²⁷ Swanstrom and Weissmann, 9-10.

century demand a better method of viewing conflict than that of the past. These conflicts demand prevention, management, and resolution and have no definitive beginnings or ends. They will require the U.S. military to perform more than just a basic combat role in the defense of its nation.

The OSCE Model


The most applicable method for viewing conflict as a conflict cycle for the U.S. Army, based on the President's guidance in NSPD-44, is the one used by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe for the following reasons. First, the OSCE was a pioneer in the 1970s and hence a great practitioner of the concept of cooperative security, one where the security of one state is inherently linked to that of all other states.²⁸ Additionally, the OSCE was an early proponent of comprehensive security, viewing security not merely through the political-military prism but also through an economic/ environmental and human dimension.²⁹ These two pillars, cooperative and comprehensive security, already expressed in disparate parts of U.S. Army doctrine³⁰ will never come to full fruition under the Spectrum of Conflict. The spectrum's inability to incorporate fully the concept of conflict prevention limits the Army's ability to contribute to the cooperative security of the United States. In addition, the spectrum's view of violence on an ascending scale confines the solutions the Army proposes to ones in the political-military dimension, negating the idea of comprehensive security. If the Army chooses to view conflict as a cycle, as the OSCE does, it will come closer to realizing and achieving cooperative

²⁸ Marc Perrin de Brichambaut, "The OSCE and South Eastern Europe" *Crossroads: The Macedonian Foreign Policy Journal* (Volume 1, Number 1, December 2006). E-Journal on-line. P. 106.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Department of the Army, Field Manual 11-31, *Army International Security Cooperation Policy*, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2007), 2; Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-21.31,

and comprehensive security for the United States. The Army will prepare itself to manage conflict in this “Era of Persistent” conflict. The OSCE cycle, depicted in the diagram below, has four stages: early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management, and post-conflict rehabilitation.



Each stage is associated with unique tools and designed to work with the others to limit the disruption of conflict to nations, regions, and the international community. Those who want to intervene within the conflict cycle must become knowledgeable about each stage and how they interact with the others if they want to interdict and break the cycle of conflict.

DoD Incorporation

The Army does not have to look far to find examples of units who already exemplify how to use the conflict cycle to design and conduct operations in the defense of the nation. The Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) provides a real world example of a Department of Defense organization operating within the conflict cycle framework. The mission of the organization is to employ an indirect approach to counter violent extremism; conducting operations to strengthen partner nation and regional security capacity to enable long-term regional

The Stryker Brigade Combat Team, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2003), 8-1; and FM 3-07, 1-4.

stability, prevent conflict, and protect U.S. and Coalition interests.³¹ The vision of the organization is to build friendships, forge relationships, and create partnerships to enable African solutions to African challenges; through combined joint forces, they improve security, increase stability, and strengthen sovereignty and accomplish it by being a model for the integration of Defense, Diplomacy, and Development efforts.³² CJTF-HOA is a concrete example of how the Army can use the Conflict Cycle to visualize its operations in this “Era of Persistent Conflict”.

The second example of how the Army can implement the concept of the Conflict Cycle comes from the newly formed Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACG). The JIACG is a full-time, multifunctional advisory element of the combatant commander’s staff that facilitates information sharing throughout the interagency community.³³ Through habitual collaboration, it provides a means to integrate campaign planning efforts at the strategic and operational levels and throughout all U.S. government agencies.³⁴ The JIACG serves three important functions. First, it participates in theater strategic engagement, deliberate, crisis action, transition, and reconstruction planning and operations. Second, it informs the combatant commander and the joint task force of civilian agency campaign planning, sensitivities, and support requirements, capabilities, and limitations. Third, it informs civilian agencies of the combatant commander’s and the joint task force’s operational requirements, concerns, capabilities, and limitations.

Although neither CJTF-HOA nor JIACGs are strict Army elements, the principles underlying both this organization and coordination group are applicable to Army missions and deployments. Reframing how the Army, and ultimately Brigade Combat Teams, views conflict

³¹ Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa website - <http://www.hoa.africom.mil/AboutCJTF-HOA.asp>. Accessed 12 March 2009.

³² Ibid.

³³ United States Joint Forces Command – Joint Interagency Coordination Group website - http://www.jfcom.mil/about/fact_jiacg.htm. Accessed 12 March 2009.

will not deteriorate any of its core missions. In fact, it will finally allow stability operations to be commensurate with combat operations.

Early Warning

At the top of the conflict cycle, Early Warning begins the process of gathering information on impending conflict.³⁵ Klaas van Walraven describes it as “the communication of information on a crisis area, analysis of that information, and development of potential, timely, strategic response options to the crisis”.³⁶ The purpose of the stage is to make nation-states, security organizations, or international organizations aware of pending issues or problems within nations or regions. This gathering of information serves three purposes. First, gathering information helps nation-states develop a set of indicators for evaluating internal conflict within others. This qualitative interpretation helps the nation-state understand each society’s “fault lines” and “breaking points” taking into account the regional context and local roots.³⁷ Second, gathering information keeps the international community aware of changes in the political and military climates of nations that may influence their own national security. As Janie Leatherman, et al describe in *Breaking Cycles of Violence: Conflict Prevention in Intrastate Crises*, the importance of providing quality and timely information as to impending trouble or conflict is essential for maintaining international stability.³⁸ Finally, gathering information is the only way for nation-states to determine when to warrant intervention in another nation. In his *Agenda for*

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Emma Stewart, “Conflict Prevention: Consensus or Confusion? *Peace, Conflict and Development: An Interdisciplinary Journal* (Volume 3, Issue Three, June 2003). E-Journal on-line, 3.

³⁶ Klaas van Walraven, *Early Warning and Conflict Prevention* (Boston: Kluwer Law International, 1998), 52.

³⁷ Janie Leatherman and others, *Breaking Cycles of Violence: Conflict Prevention in Intrastate Crises*, (West Hartford, Connecticut: Kumarian Press, 1999), 9 & 14.

³⁸ Ibid., 7.

Peace, Boutros-Ghali, states early warning is the identification of threats to international peace and security that calls for a synthesis between broad-based risk information and political indicators to assess the seriousness of the threat or information on economic and social developments that may, unless mitigated, threaten international peace and security.³⁹

There is no standard method for this gathering of information. How international actors monitor the information they require or desire depends upon the institution doing the monitoring. It is only essential that those international actors involved in monitoring gain access to the nation, be aware of problems, and identify when those problems are going to lead to conflict.⁴⁰ While the method is not important, it is imperative that nations within the international community conduct early warning. The absolute necessity lies in the fact that in today's world there is often a rapid escalation to violence in conflicts with international ramifications that do not allow for lengthy international discussions, but require immediate action.⁴¹

Early Warning requires the United States to be proactive instead of reactive, to recognize the signs signaling impending conflict, both intrastate and interstate, and to take action when it is within the nation's national security strategy to do so. The military cannot and should not do this alone. The revised FM 3-07 is instrumental in showing the Army how a "whole of government" approach is vital to managing the conflicts of the future, integrating all of the elements of national power. CJTF-HOA and the JIACG provide excellent examples of how the Army can design organizations from within to provide for early warning. The structure and mission of CJTF-HOA clearly shows integration between the organization and the nations it covers within the Horn of

³⁹ Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping*, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992, (New York: United Nations, 1992), 15-16.

⁴⁰ Leatherman and others, 10.


⁴¹ Wallensteen and Sollenberg, 9.

Africa. This integration is essential for early warning because it makes the organization familiar with the norms of each nation and aware when the climate within has changed and conflict is impending. The structure and mission of the JIACG is a clear example of how to integrate all the disparate parts of the United States government. The integration of these organizations, with different focuses and means of collecting information, gives a broader picture of each nation. Scholars, the media, intelligence agencies, as well as governments, international organizations, and non-governmental organizations all have the ability to provide early warning information through monitoring and reporting.⁴²

Performing stability operations in this phase of the cycle, truly allows for the whole of government approach that FM 3-07 talks about, with all of these individuals and organizations contributing to knowing and understanding the actors and their agendas within the conflict space. “For early warning to be effective, the initial information gathering phase of early warning should cast a fairly wide net to gain as complete a picture as possible, and keep it up-to-date. It has to gauge social reality in a valid manner that is also usable in everyday political practice. This means that: (1) the instruments of early warning have to be streamlined and contextualized according to relevant criteria; (2) the information produced by them must be user-friendly and tailored to specific decision needs; and (3) the main early warning messages must be continuous and consistent.”⁴³ As the figure below, the Army can easily incorporate Peacetime Military Engagements into the Early Warning stage of the conflict cycle and allowing Army units to assess and address potential conflict in order to manage it from an early stage.

⁴² Leatherman and others, 7.

⁴³ Ibid., 36.



Conflict Prevention

The most studied and debated stage within the conflict cycle, conflict prevention is a term that suggests different things to different people and there is no agreed-upon meaning of the term among scholars.⁴⁴ Leatherman et al describe it as “preventing violent disputes from arising between parties either by structural, institutional, economic, or cultural remedies”⁴⁵ Boutros Boutros-Ghali as “action to prevent disputes between parties and to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts.”⁴⁶ Moreover, Emma Stewart, in an attempt to coalesce all the

⁴⁴ Peter Wallensteen and Frida Moller. *Conflict Prevention: Methodology for Knowing the Unknown*. Uppsala University, Sweden: Department of Peace and Conflict Research, 2003. Internet on-line. Available from http://www.pcr.uu.se/publications/UPRP_pdf/UPRP_No. 7.pdf. [06 August 2008].

⁴⁵ Janie Leatherman and others, 99.

⁴⁶ Boutros-Ghali, 11.

existing definitions, describes it as “any attempt by third parties in the international arena to prevent the outbreak of violent conflict; it is a multi-faceted, complex process ranging from long-term or structural policy to promote stability, to short-term intensive diplomacy to resolve disputes.”⁴⁷ The slight variations on the definition are more demonstrative of the particular focus and background experiences of the scholars than of significant differences in their philosophies. As the definitions above express, most scholars agree that conflict prevention requires some type of action prior to the outbreak of violent conflict.

While not settling on one definition of conflict prevention, the OSCE uses the same approach to prevention as the United Nations and others within the international community, focusing on two modes of prevention – structural and operational.⁴⁸ Moreover, the OSCE assumed an early role in establishing the international norms related to conflict prevention.⁴⁹ For the OSCE structural prevention “aims at tackling the root causes of potentially violent conflicts such as economic inequality and deficient democracy, as well as exclusive state- and nation-building strategies”.⁵⁰ Whereas special prevention “always contains specific measures aimed at specific conflict at a certain stage”.⁵¹ Structural prevention is long-term and more comprehensive approach to conflict prevention. Special prevention is more short-term and direct, designed to

⁴⁷ Stewart, 3.

⁴⁸ Carnegie Report; Annan Report; Stanski article.

⁴⁹ Alice Ackerman, “The Prevention of Armed Conflicts as an Emerging Norm in International Conflict Management: The OSCE and the UN as Norm Leaders.” *Peace and Conflict Studies* (Spring 2003). E-Journal on-line, 341.

⁵⁰ Wolfgang Zellner, “The OSCE: Uniquely Qualified for a Conflict-Prevention Role,” in *Searching for Peace in Europe and Eurasia: An Overview of Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities*, eds. Paul van Tongeren, Hans van de Veen, and Juliette Verhoeven (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), 18-19.

⁵¹ Ibid.

address immediate crises.⁵² The OSCE requires both approaches to conflict prevention because its goal is to both end conflict and break the cycle of conflict. A conclusive definition of conflict prevention is unimportant, so long as the result of that prevention is the stabilization of the society using preventative actions.⁵³

The Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict argues at length that the “potential for violence can be defused through the early, skillful, and integrated application of political, diplomatic, economic, and military measures.”⁵⁴ CJTF-HOA and the JIACG continue to serve as examples of how the Army can utilize both organizations’ basic principles to use stability operations to prevent conflict. Incorporating the stability tasks of FM 3-07 into Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) with the same basic principles of CJTF-HOA and JIACG allows for conflict prevention. Taking CJTF-HOA’s familiarity with its region and the capabilities JIACG brings to bear, the Army can organize BCTs that address both structural and special preventative measures. In a multi-polar world, filled with challenges, conflict prevention is vital if one wants to sustain the ability to use military force when it is necessary. The benefits of conflict prevention for the United States Government and military are multi-fold. The Army cannot and should not address every conflict in the world. If the Army lets the NSS guide their actions, then it will only intervene when it is in its direct interest to do so. However, combining the two approaches of CJTF-HOA and JIACG and the stability operations manual, the Army leaves open the option of strongly supporting other institutions who intervene when it is not convenient or expedient for the United States to do so. Designing an effective organization to address conflict prevention is

⁵² Anderlini, Sanam Naraghi and Victoria Stanski. *Conflict Prevention*. Retrieved 25 February 2009 from www.huntalternatives.org/download/28_conflict_prevention.pdf, 1-2.

⁵³ Janie Leatherman and others, 8.

⁵⁴ Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, *Preventing Deadly Conflict*, (New York: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, 1997), xvii.

essential if the Army wants to address the second, third, and fourth order effects of its actions and break the cycle of conflict. “Conflict prevention is a vital component in a broader approach to conflict management – one, that entails not only measures to manage the escalatory or post-violent phases of conflict, but also the pre-violent or low-violent stage where it might be still possible to prevent the outbreak of large-scale hostilities and bloodshed”.⁵⁵

Crisis Management

The Crisis Management stage of the conflict cycle is that of actual intervention after the initiation of a conflict. The OSCE characterizes this stage as civilian or military intervention to monitor and/or control the early stages of conflict.⁵⁶ In maintaining the comprehensive security approach described earlier, one that combines the political/military, human dimension, and economic/environmental aspects of conflict, the OSCE sets two basic parameters for its interventions. Defined zones of intervention are the first of these. The organization generally intervenes in conflict situations where “the rule of law has no firm grounding and where domestic institutions are not fully effective or do not enjoy enough general public confidence”.⁵⁷ The second parameter defines intervention based on inter-institutional cooperation. Choosing to intervene in conflict situations where the organization can cooperate with other international institutions, the OSCE stresses interoperability so that it can deliver tangible benefits in terms of efficiency and effectiveness.⁵⁸

⁵⁵ Ackerman, 1.

⁵⁶ Stewart, 3.

⁵⁷ Victor-Yves Ghebali, “The OSCE long-term missions: A creative tool under challenge” Retrieved 02 October 2008 from <http://fw8pk7vf4q.scholar.serialssolutions.com/?sid=google&auinit=VI&aualast=Ghebali&atitle=The+OSCE+long-term+missions:+A+creative+tool+under+challenge&id=doi:10.1163/1571814041954235>

⁵⁸ “Some reflections on the OSCE experience” H.E. Mr Niek van Zutphen, Ambassador Representative of the OSCE Chairmanship-in-Office Retrieved 02 March 2009 from www.itcm.org/pdf2/Speech_vanZutphen.pdf

The forms of OSCE interventions, or crisis management, vary from dispute settlement on the low end of the violence scale to armed force interventions on the high end. The substantive manifestations of those interventions range from fact-finding and monitoring missions to the deployment of peacekeeping forces.⁵⁹ While recognizing that crisis management activities will commence post hostilities, the OSCE's mandate supposes that these activities will also include specific efforts to promote a settlement of the underlying causes of the conflict while also engaging in preventive activities to avert the reoccurrence of violence.⁶⁰ At best, crisis management keeps a developing conflict situation from building to the point of needing to send in armed forces. At worst, crisis management is the actual occupation of a nation with the armed forces of another in order to reestablish a legitimate and functioning national government. The vast potential and complexity of the conflicts in the world today are increasingly making crisis management more difficult. Knowing when and how to intervene in another nation is a delicate political and military balancing act.

While the actual actions of the Army in crisis management do not change, the Army would still be prepared and ready to conduct major combat operations, the planning requires more for an Army needing to manage rather than solve conflict. Originally, the mission focus for CJTF-HOA focused on a "kinetic" orientation, being prepared to apprehend and prevent the movement of suspected terrorist operatives.⁶¹ This eventually changed to a long-term effort aimed at

⁵⁹ Meyer, Berthold. "Dispute Settlement Procedures and Crisis Management." In *The OSCE in the Maintenance of Peace and Security: Conflict Prevention, Crisis Management and Peaceful Settlement of Disputes*, ed. Michael Bothe, Natalino Ronzitti and Allan Rosas, (The Hague; Boston: Kluwer Law International, 1997), 76.

⁶⁰ P. Terrence Hopmann. "An Evaluation of the OSCE's Role in Conflict Management." In *Europe's New Security Challenges*, ed. Erich Reiter, Adrian G.V. Hyde-Price and Heinz Gartner (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), 226.

⁶¹ Admiral Gregory G. Johnson (Ret.), "The 'Long War' Demands Proactive Engagement in Africa" in Online Africa Policy Forum, 02 October 2006. Retrieved 12 March 2009 from <http://forums.csis.org/africa/?p=8>.

assisting regional governments develop effective governance and anti-terrorism capacity.⁶² In managing, rather than solving, the conflicts of the 21st century, the Army has to plan for the foundation laid prior to major combat operations and has to plan for the rebuilding that will come after. Failing in either of these tasks will mean all the efforts expended to win the fight will be for naught. Given the cost of violent conflicts, in both financial and human terms, failure should not be an option.⁶³ Crisis management is more than just major combat operations though, it is also dealing with and understanding the root causes of the conflict. “Failure to deal with root causes rather than just the symptoms of violent disorder occurs all too frequently. If there is any clear lesson in post-Cold War peacemaking efforts, it is that ending, at least temporarily, internal conflicts is often the easy part of the task. Providing jobs for combatants, constructing credible institutions of government, especially in areas of security and justice, providing for the victims of the conflict, and promoting national reconciliation are all daunting long-range tasks.”⁶⁴ Provincial Reconstruction Teams in both Iraq and Afghanistan and Army BCTs deployed to both of these places have dealt and continue to deal with the root causes of conflict. While currently done on an ad hoc basis, the Army will need to incorporate the lessons of both into doctrine for the future.

Post-Conflict Rehabilitation Stage

Upon completion of the crisis management stage, often where armed confrontation was the result, the OSCE enters the post-conflict rehabilitation stage of the conflict cycle. In the aftermath of violence, this role entails efforts to build stable democratic societies capable of resolving differences peacefully but in the midst of the chaos and physical destruction, that

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Ackerman, 339.

⁶⁴ Richard L. Millett, “A Multiplicity of Threats, a Paucity of Options: The Global Security Environment at the End of the Twentieth Century,” in *Beyond Declaring Victory and Coming Home: The*

typically follows violent conflict.⁶⁵ In the post-conflict rehabilitation stage of the conflict cycle, the OSCE's philosophy is one of "rebuilding war-torn societies through the reconstruction of the political system and the rehabilitation of the infrastructure required for normal human activity".⁶⁶ Maintaining its comprehensive and cooperative approach to security, the OSCE uses an integrated and field activity/mission methodology for reconstruction and rehabilitation. The integrated approach allows the OSCE to address the various political, social, economic, and cultural aspects of the conflict.⁶⁷ The mission methodology allows the OSCE to conduct operations within nations based on consensus from both member nations and the mission's host country, providing the right amount of support to a specific post-conflict situation. The specific activities conducted by the OSCE in these missions include monitoring human rights, property restoration, judicial and legal reform, criminal justice, and the establishment of democratic institutions and processes.⁶⁸ Post-conflict rehabilitation is an all-encompassing strategy, acting across governmental functions, designed to restore a legitimate government capable of providing government by consent to nations inflicted by conflict.

The role of the OSCE in post-conflict rehabilitation is also to set the stage for the prevention of future conflict and long-term solutions. This role varies drastically today from the one envisioned during the early 1970's due to the nature of today's conflicts. Post-conflict reconstruction is now a new experience of massive social engineering; it is less physical

Challenges of Peace and Stability Operations, ed. Max G. Manwaring and Anthony James Joes (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 2000), 14.

⁶⁵ Hopmann, 245.

⁶⁶ Ibid., 246.

⁶⁷ Maria Raquel Freire. *Conflict and Security in the Former Soviet Union*. (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2003), 6.

⁶⁸ Heiko Borchert and Wolfgang Zellner. "The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and its Contributions to the Stabilization of Central and Eastern European Countries", January 2003, Retrieved 25 February 2009 from Columbia International Affairs Online, 17-18.

reconstruction and more building of societal coherence.⁶⁹ The whole fabric of a nation may require rebuilding when destroyed by ethnic tensions. Preventing future conflict and fostering long-term solutions, in a nation where post-conflict rehabilitation is taking place, will in these cases demand confidence building and the restoration of legitimacy in conjunction with or before physical reconstruction takes place.⁷⁰ This work cannot be done by only outside actors or inside actors, for success, it requires the work of actors both within and outside of the nation.⁷¹ Additionally, conflicts of today increasingly demand post-conflict rehabilitation begin prior to the end of hostilities. While intervening organizations must ensure a basic degree of security before the work of rehabilitating the human and economic dimensions can begin, rarely will all conflict within the nation cease prior to engagement by the OSCE.⁷²

The new Stability Operations manual already clearly identifies the new stability tasks the Army needs to complete. The key for a successful Army intervention is planning for post-conflict rehabilitation at the start of an operation, instead of at the end. Gone are the days when the U.S. Army can fight a war and then redeploy, if there ever were such days. The Army must and does understand that it will have to rebuild societies and national infrastructure. Having a plan and understanding how conflict changed that plan will lead to success.

Viewing conflict as a cycle simply allows the Army to better integrate stability operations into the overall campaign plan and mission. Understanding the conflict cycle is critical to utilizing it to frame conflict and comprehend how conflict prevention, management, and post-

⁶⁹ Bjorn Hettne, "Security Regionalism in Europe and South Asia," in *New and Critical Security and Regionalism: Beyond the Nation State*, ed. James Hentz and Morten Boas (Burlington, Vermont: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2003), 149-150.

⁷⁰ Freire, 6.

⁷¹ Hettne, 149-150.

⁷² Bruce George and Anthony McGee, "The OSCE's Approach to Conflict Prevention and Post-Conflict Rehabilitation," in *Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding in Post-War Societies: Sustaining the Peace*, ed. T. David Mason and James D. Meernik (New York: Routledge, 2006), 90.

conflict reconstruction work together to prevent future conflict. Intervening at the right place within the cycle, at the right moment in time, could mean the difference between ending a recurring cycle of conflict or allowing it to continue unabated. The conflict cycle used by the OSCE is the most applicable for utilization by the United States Army because it provides a basis for cooperative and comprehensive security. These two security pillars are the basis of the new Stability Operations manual and it is only through viewing conflict as a cycle that the Army can fully incorporate stability operations into Full Spectrum Operations. In order to understand why the conflict cycle is more appropriate for incorporating stability operations into Army operations, it is first important to review the concepts within the new manual, which will never meet their full potential if viewed under the Spectrum of Conflict. These concepts demand a more useful contextual setting in order to operationalize them and make them of enduring use to Army forces.

The Potential of FM 3-07

“As the military has quickly discovered, relief and stability operations are among the most complex missions it is called upon to undertake. Such operations often exist in an uncertain space between peace and war, a world that is neither black nor white”.⁷³ The Army’s release of the revised FM 3-07 has a tremendous amount of potential for changing not only the way the Army views stability operations, but also how it conducts the full range of Army operations. While the majority of the manual focuses on concrete stability tasks, the potential for transformative change comes more from the first two chapters on Strategic Context and Stability in Full Spectrum Operations. The potential for change centers on three concepts, two of which are implicit within the text and one that is explicit. The first implicit concept is the idea of conflict prevention. The second is the idea of varied solutions to complex problems, or a general adherence to the concepts of Design. The explicit concept with potential for changing both

stability and Army operations is the manual's depiction of stability operations within Full Spectrum Operations. The doctrine written in the pages of FM 3-07 is undeniably vastly different from that of its predecessors. Operationalizing these three transformative change concepts, so that they are of enduring use to the force and can be built upon in the future, will take the Army revising how it views conflict. Failing to do so will limit the Army's ability to realize the full potential of FM 3-07 and its changing role in promoting the security of the United States.

Conflict Prevention

While FM 3-07 does not specifically address conflict prevention, the manual gives strong credence to the idea in the Strategic Approach portion of Chapter 1. Given the vast increase in conflict situations over the past few decades and the occasionally public pressure put on the President of the United States to intervene militarily in intra-state conflict and humanitarian disasters, the Army has a vested interest in understanding and applying conflict prevention. This manual recognizes these realities and begins to give the Army tools to address the prevention of conflict. Using stability operations to reduce conflict and instability and build governance in order to secure peace, security, and economic growth closely mirrors both the OSCE and United Nations conflict prevention missions.⁷⁴ The elements of Strategic Approach most closely linked to conflict prevention are the comprehensive approach, conflict transformation, legitimacy, capacity building, and the rule of law. These parallel the good governance approach advocated by Melander and Nkuadabagenzi; the societal approach supported by Ackerman; the confidence building view of Boutros-Ghali; and the conflict transformation method promoted by Carment.⁷⁵

⁷³ Perito, 233.

⁷⁴ Ackerman, 341.

⁷⁵ Alice Ackerman. "Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe" slide presentation. Retrieved 06 August 2008 from http://drc2008.idresearch.hu/userfiles/File/drc2008_speakers/Presentation%20Ackermann.ppt, slide 7;

The context of conflict prevention in the case of the Army is one of security for the United States, this is not necessarily the case for other advocates of conflict prevention; however, the two may and in some cases should be mutually supporting.

The Stability Operations manual is very concise in the definitions it provides for each of the above elements and helps set the basis for conflict prevention. Working to integrate the cooperative efforts of the United States Government, intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, multinational partners, and private sector entities to achieve a common goal, the Army recognizes stability operations are limited unless derived from a comprehensive approach.⁷⁶ An approach that is willing to understand and work with international partners, who may not employ the same methods, but have the same aims of stability within a country. FM 3-07 defines conflict transformation as the process of reducing violent conflict while developing more viable, peaceful alternatives.⁷⁷ This accurate interpretation of the need to employ structural conflict prevention, those actions that work on the root causes of conflicts, shows the manual contains a firm understanding of conflict prevention. The manual defines legitimacy in terms of governments and the military mission. For governments to be legitimate they must exhibit the following characteristics: honors and upholds basic human rights and fundamental freedoms; responsive to their citizens; exercises effective sovereignty; and limits the reach of their government.⁷⁸ Most of the literature on conflict prevention uses the terms democratization and

Boutros-Ghali, 13-14; Melander and Pigache, 14; David Carment and Albrecht Schnabel. *Conflict Prevention: Path to Peace or Grand Illusion?* (New York: United Nations University Press, 2003), 14; Nkundabagenzi, Felix. "Political Dialogue or Conditionality? Lessons from the Cotonou Agreement" in *Civilian Perspective or Security Strategy? European Development Policy Confronting New Challenges in Foreign and Security Policy, World Economy, Ecology, and Development (WEED)*, 2004. Retrieved 13 March 2009 from http://www2.weed-online.org/uploads/eu_civilian_perspective_2005.pdf.

⁷⁶ FM 3-07, 1-4 and 1-5.

⁷⁷ Ibid., 1-6.

⁷⁸ Ibid., 1-7.

human rights support to explain what the Army terms as legitimacy.⁷⁹ FM 3-07 defines capacity building as the process of creating an environment that fosters host-nation institutional development, community participation, human resources development, and strengthening managerial systems.⁸⁰ Lastly, FM 3-07 defines the rule of law as a principle where the international community holds those within a state accountable to the public laws of said state and where such laws are consistent with international human rights principles.⁸¹

Varied Solutions to Complex Problems

The Army recognizes the fact that it will face a number of complex problems in the future.⁸² However, only FM 3-07 currently implies there are varied solutions, not necessarily military in nature, to these problems and explores what that means for Army operations. Using the concepts of unity of effort, a whole of government approach, and a comprehensive approach, the new stability manual examines how varied solutions in peace and war eventually lead to enduring peace and stability. Unity of effort requires the Army to understand how complex problems, within and without the military realm, affect the synchronization, coordination, and integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities. The solutions the Army offers to these complex problems demand unity of effort before, during, and after conflict. This is a change from many past Army operations, where coordinated action was non-existent prior to and during conflict and extremely limited post-conflict.⁸³ A whole of government

⁷⁹ Boutros-Ghali, 13-14; Melander, 14; Carment, 14; Nkundabagenzi, 32.

⁸⁰ FM 3-07, 1-8.

⁸¹ Ibid., 1-9.

⁸² FM 3-0, vii; FM 3-07, vi.

⁸³ Garland H. Williams, *Engineering Peace: The Military Role in Postconflict Reconstruction*, (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2005); Conrad C. Crane and W. Andrew Terrill, "Reconstructing Iraq: Insights, Challenges, and Missions for Military Forces in a Post-Conflict Scenario" Retrieved 24 March 2009 from http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2003/Reconstruction_Planning.pdf

approach offers varied solutions to complex problems through the prism of Design. In advocating an approach where all of the actors share an understanding of the situation and problem to be resolved, FM 3-07 closely mirrors emerging doctrine on Design. Design advocates a more nuanced and deeper understanding of the environment enabling effective decisions on how to utilize the instruments of national power. These effective decisions have the potential to make the employment of the Army one of degree and scope instead of one of scale. Finally, a comprehensive approach builds on the previous two concepts by combining unity of effort and the whole of government approach into a framework that expands upon the coordination and collaboration and Design theme present in those two concepts. Implicit in the comprehensive approach are the ideas that numerous actors affect the problem, including some in the international arena who will refuse to work with the Army, and the belief that every actor affects the system and problem, creating second, third, and fourth order effects with their actions and decisions. The Stability Operations manual's strategy for stability operations is critical for helping the Army understand and work to solve the complex problems it will face in the 21st century.

Stability Operations in Full Spectrum Operations

The United States government and others have conducted extensive studies showing the disastrous results of stability operations in the wake of the wars in both Iraq and Afghanistan.⁸⁴ The remedy for the United States government started with the publication of the State Department manual, followed by DOD Directive 3000.5, and eventually the new draft and release of the

⁸⁴ United States Government Accountability Office, "Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: GAO Audits and Key Oversight Issues" Retrieved 18 March 2009 from <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08231t.pdf>; United States Government Accountability Office, "Iraq and Afghanistan: Security, Economic, and Governance Challenges to Rebuilding Efforts Should Be Addressed in U.S. Strategies" Retrieved 26 March 2009 from <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA495709&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf>; Conrad C. Crane and W. Andrew Terrill.


Army's Stability Operations manual, FM 3-07. FM 3-07 brings stability operations on par with offensive and defensive operations by providing it with real tasks and making it central to doctrine. This revising of the stability operations framework into one where the Army links its stability tasks to the stability sectors of the State Department is central to being able to achieve the right emphasis on stability operations at the right time and location. In making stability operations one of the core elements of full spectrum operations, the Army is forcing its leaders and soldiers to think about these tasks as they conduct offense and defense, the more destructive effects of combat power. As Secretary of Defense Robert Gates concisely states in the new stability manual, the Army "has shifted towards new capabilities to shape the security environment in ways that obviate the need for military intervention in the future".⁸⁵ The potential of FM 3-07 lies in its understanding that the future of the Army is as much about preventing conflict within the framework of stability operations as it is in being able to go to war when the nation calls upon it to do so.

FM 3-07 is groundbreaking in its approach to both stability operations and the understanding that 21st century conflict demands a new approach from the United States Army. The manual is also a step toward an understanding that the spectrum of conflict from FM 3-0 is not adequate for viewing the role of the Army in 21st century conflict. Stability Operations, as depicted in FM 3-07, will never reach the full potential the Army envisions for them within Full Spectrum Operations if they are constrained by the Spectrum of Conflict. To realize its full potential, the Army needs to view stability operations in terms of the Conflict Cycle. Viewing stability operations within the Conflict Cycle framework will allow the Army to practice conflict prevention, promote varied solutions to complex problems utilizing Design, and fully utilize Full Spectrum Operations in planning and execution. Conflict prevention is important to the U.S.

⁸⁵ FM 3-07, 2-1.

Army because future operations will likely demand prevention over full military involvement. As the lessons learned from Iraq and Afghanistan have made clear, complex problems exist and demand varied solutions capable of solving complex problems. Fully utilizing Full Spectrum Operations will allow the Army to remain strong and relevant because shaping the security environment means more than just preparing for war. No single answer will be right for every conflict encountered in this “Era of persistent conflict”. The Conflict Cycle is the better option for incorporating stability operations within the U.S. Army.

Ultimately, though, FM 3-07 is only the first cut in operationalizing one element of the conflict cycle, because Army doctrine still binds these operations by the idea that stability takes place after conflict. The Army continues to bind it this way because it views conflict as a spectrum, with force allocation by violence and not by the scope and degree for which the Army needs them. The fact is stability must take place at all stages, something viewing conflict as a cycle would enable the Army to do. The new stability manual in its current form has the potential to bridge the conflict prevention, conflict management, and post-conflict reconstruction stages of the cycle (See Figure below) and with some minor work; it could include the early warning stage on more than a military scale. The manual is generally consistent with DOD Directive 3000.5 in bridging those last three stages, but fails to incorporate all the stages as NSPD-44 directs. If the Army chose to view conflict as a cycle, the force could eventually operationalize stability operations to include all four stages.



Incorporating Stability Ops Into a Cycle Framework

Having shown that in order to harness the true potential of stability operations the Army needs to view them as part of a conflict cycle versus a spectrum of conflict, the question remains, what advantages does incorporating stability operations into a cycle framework offer that cannot currently be met using the Spectrum of Conflict? There are three advantages resulting from incorporating stability operations into the conflict cycle framework. First, the conflict cycle allows the Army to start viewing military operations as a scope and degree of military force instead of as a scale. Second, it allows the Army to prepare a true unity of effort response for the United States government. Third, the conflict cycle better prepares the Army to incorporate the Design approach to problem solving, the potential future commander's methodology for framing and solving complex problems. These advantages are what will keep the United States secure and relevant in this "Era of Persistent Conflict".

Scope and Degree of Military Force

Incorporating Stability Operations into a Cycle Framework allows for a scope and degree of military force versus a scale. Under the current Spectrum of Operations, the Army bases the scale of its military involvement on the increasing amount of violence encountered along the

spectrum. In the Conflict Cycle, the Army can perform stability operations to their maximum potential at every stage of the cycle. In the Early Warning stage, the military is able to leverage the partnerships it speaks about in FM 3-07 to understand the breaking points of its nations of interest. Using the cycle, allows the Army to widen the scope or increase the degree of military involvement in order to prevent conflict where it is in the national interest of the United States. Conflict prevention may require more of a force allocation than actual combat in many of these nations. Furthermore, the post-conflict rehabilitation stage may also require a larger force to ensure a smooth transition from armed conflict to the actual functioning of the nation. Viewing conflict as a cycle allows the Army to put the right number of forces on the ground for its given objective, rather than building the force structure based solely on the level of violence. Initially the scope of the military could be very broad under conflict prevention; however using the premises of stability operations, the degree may be small if the Army takes the appropriate actions early in the cycle. There are opportunities to intervene at each stage of the conflict cycle, but if the military is successful in either of the first two stages then it limits the size of military involvement, but not necessarily the scope.⁸⁶

Unity of Effort

Additionally, incorporating stability operations into a cycle framework allows for a true unity of effort in the United States Government response to any given international situation. Taking the lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. Army understands the importance of working with Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and Interagency partners. This does not just apply to post-conflict reconstruction. Applying this whole of government approach to the earlier stages of the conflict cycle will mean less energy spent on the last two stages and help break the cycle. “Uniting all of the diverse capabilities necessary to achieve success in stability

⁸⁶ Wallenstein, 7.

operations requires collaborative and cooperative paradigms that focus those capabilities toward a common goal”.⁸⁷ Viewing conflict as a cycle allows for true unity of effort. It focuses the entire government on national security; allows for the coordination of numerous agencies under the heading of conflict prevention; still gives the military the lead during crisis management; and helps provide a smooth transition from crisis management to post-conflict rehabilitation because all of the government agencies have been involved since the beginning. Under the early warning phase, while each entity gathers and analyzes information about direct threats to the United States, their focuses are necessarily different, but not without compliment. Taking information from all the elements of DIME gives the United States Government a comprehensive picture. Conflict prevention absolutely necessitates a true unity of effort given the vastly different resources of each element of DIME. Nothing changes for the military under the crisis management stage of the cycle. They are still the lead. However, there is a clear understanding that the military will continue to support and must plan an easy transition to post-conflict rehabilitation during the crisis management stage. Actions taken by any organization during any of these stages will affect and influence the actions of the others during subsequent stages.

Incorporating Design

The new Design approach fielded by the Army lends itself more to viewing conflict as a cycle versus a spectrum. As the Army increasingly finds itself operating in environments, where conflict is complex, multidimensional, and increasingly fought among the people, the conflict cycle recognizes that force alone will not solve the problems or break the cycle. The Design Approach encourages commanders to learn through action in order to understand more clearly the operational environments they work within and the logic of the underlying events in that system. Incorporating stability operations into a cycle framework plainly allows for a clearer

⁸⁷ FM 3-07, 1-3.

understanding of the operational environment and the underlying logic by focusing on both during the first two stages of the cycle. Both early warning and conflict prevention have system understanding as their basis. This system understanding is the beginning for all action and solutions and should the conflict progress the understanding in the later stages as well. Leading conflict prevention scholars argue that it matters not whether civilians or the military practice conflict prevention, what matters is whether they can tailor their actions to match the emerging situation.⁸⁸ Additionally, many argue that the international community can only consider conflict prevention successful when it prevents or ends conflict in the short-term and undertakes efforts to alter the underlying causes of violence.⁸⁹ The advantage of using the conflict cycle is being able to recognize when stability operations is the right answer to the right problem. Because conflict is most often a recurring cycle in the places the Army will intervene, comprehending the logic will allow for early warning, effective conflict prevention, the right amount of crisis management, and specifically tailored post-conflict rehabilitation that will break the cycle.

Conclusion

War is a difficult and demanding teacher. The lessons learned by the Army in its wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have been difficult and given a certain impetus to quickly incorporating those lessons learned into doctrine. Few were as critical, or necessitated such huge revision, as those of post-conflict stability operations. Using NSPD-44 and DoD Directive 3000.5 as its basis, the Army's revision of FM 3-07 was little short of dramatic in its revision of previous doctrine. The concepts within the manual offer both military and policy makers within the United States government a broadening of the definition of stability operations and the potential to incorporate them into Army operations with striking results. There, however, remains a significant constraint

⁸⁸ Wallenstein, 14.

⁸⁹ Ibid., 8.

on fully incorporating the new doctrine. Because the Army continues to view conflict as a spectrum, the potential of stability operations and their ultimate effectiveness linger in doubt. In order to effectively conduct stability operations and prevent future conflict, the United States Army needs to recast that spectrum as a conflict cycle, shifting military involvement from one of scale to one of scope and degree.

The Spectrum of Conflict is an adequate tool for viewing traditional conflict, war between states; however, it lacks the clarity and utility for viewing conflict in the 21st century. Facing a more nebulous and less definitive threat, in a world where non-state actors play an increasingly significant role, the nation expects the U. S. Army to provide more comprehensive and inclusive interventions. The Spectrum of Conflict fails to do this. In its linear approach to conflict, the spectrum is not capable of fully integrating the ideas of conflict prevention, is limiting in the solutions it provides because it constricts the Army's view of violence, and its view of major combat operations as having definitive beginnings and ends. The Spectrum restricts how the Army organizes itself, keeping it mainly focused on conflict management, instead of allowing the Army to focus on conflict prevention.

The solution to the problems inherent in viewing conflict as a spectrum is to view it instead as a conflict cycle. As shown, the conflict cycle utilized by the OSCE is the most applicable for the U.S. Army. This conflict cycle is most useful for the Army because it incorporates the twin pillars of cooperative and comprehensive security. The four stages of the OSCE cycle: early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management, and post-conflict rehabilitation, offer unique tools and designed by the OSCE to limit the disruption of conflict within the world. The cycle gives notice of impending conflict, works to prevent it, manages it if conflict does erupt, and then rebuilds vital institutions to work toward preventing conflict from happening again in the future. Viewing conflict as a cycle inherently belies to the user that breaking the cycle is possible if the actor takes the right actions in the right stage.

The potential of the new FM 3-07 for Army operations is tremendous. The strong credence the manual gives to conflict prevention, even though it does not address it specifically, has the potential to alter drastically how the Army views both stability operations and Full Spectrum Operations. The Strategic Approach elements described in the first chapter of the manual closely parallel the conflict prevention strategies enumerated by a number of leading conflict prevention scholars. Additionally, FM 3-07's varied solutions approaches to complex problems and full incorporation of stability operations into the Full Spectrum of Operations make the manual of enduring use to the force that will use it. While already bridging three of the conflict cycle stages in its current form, FM 3-07 has the potential, with minor revisions, to incorporate the fourth and truly transform Army operations.

There are a number of advantages for incorporating stability operations into a conflict cycle framework. The cycle allows the Army to view operations as a scope and degree of military force versus a scale, allows for a true unity of effort response from the U.S. government, and better prepares the Army to incorporate the Design approach to problem solving. Each of these makes more effective use of the forces within the Army and enables the Army to meet the challenges of the 21st century.

Recommendation

Operationalizing this concept requires minor work on the part of the Army. There are already two examples within the Joint Community that exemplify how to incorporate the concepts of the conflict cycle into Army operations. CJTF-HOA and the JIACG both have missions and visions designed to utilize the four stages of the conflict cycle and provide concrete examples of concepts in practice. Their performance in each of the stages clearly shows how the U.S. Army can utilize early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management, and post-conflict rehabilitation to break the conflict cycle. Fully integrating Stability Operations in the Full Spectrum of Operations requires the Army to rewrite FM 3-0, reflecting a view of conflict as a

cycle versus a linear spectrum. Managing conflict in the 21st century demands a new method for visualizing conflict.

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